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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

.

: '-

COREY B. MAISEY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20030218-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from his conviction for disarming a peace officer, a first degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.8 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2002) (pour-over provision).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Has defendant established (a) that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
challenging defendant's seizure or (b) that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte
declaring the seizure illegal?1
This issue, raised for the first time on appeal, must be determined as a matter of law
on the existing record. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92. Defendant

1

The State's Point I responds to Defendant's Point I (ineffective counsel), Point II
(plain error), and Point III (fruit of the poisonous tree).

bears the burden of establishing that his counsel performed deficiently or that the trial court
obviously erred. See id. at*flj 8,19 & 31. Defendant also must demonstrate that, but for the
deficiency or error, there exists a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have
been different. See id.ffl[19, 31 & n.14.
2. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of defendant's fugitive status to
establish his motive in fleeing and forcibly confronting the police?
The decision to admit evidence is reviewed only for abuse of discretion; however,
when the evidence consists of prior bad acts of the defendant, the trial court must
"scrupulously examine" its relevancy, probative value, and potential prejudice before
admitting it. See State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, f 24, 61 P.3d 291 (explaining the
interplay of rules 402, 403, and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Defendant was convicted of violating section 76-5-102.8, which reads:
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally takes or removes,
or attempts to take or remove, a firearm from the person or immediate presence
of a person he knows is a peace officer:
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of his
authority as a peace officer.
Additionally, the following determinative provisions are included in Addendum A:
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV;
U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI;
UTAHR. EVID. 402;
UTAHR. EVID. 403;
UTAH R. EVID. 404.
(

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 18, 2000, defendant was charged with intentionally disarming
Detective Nathan Jensen, an Ogden police officer and member of the Weber-Morgan
Narcotics Strike Force (R. 1; R146: 135-36).
Prior to trial, defense counsel actively engaged in discovery and investigation (R. 1213, 23, 26, 51-52, 69-70). Nevertheless, defendant complained that his counsel was not
conducting discovery and was not filing requested motions (R. 45-46).2 The court questioned
defendant and counsel (R148: 2-19). Counsel explained that while he and defendant argued,
they maintained a working relationship in which counsel actively pursued discovery and
strategically considered the merits of defendant's various requests (id.). The court found
their disagreement resulted from counsel's "candid" expression to defendant of the strength
of the State's case (R148: 4-5). The court found no basis to conclude that counsel's
performance was deficient and denied defendant's request for the appointment of conflicts
counsel (R. 73).
On April 9, 2001, a two-day jury trial commenced (R. 77-78). Defendant did not
testify, but called five witnesses, including a medical/drug expert, to substantiate his claim
that he did not know Detective Jensen was a police officer and/or did not intentionally disarm
him (id.). The jury was instructed on the charged offense of disarming a peace officer and,
consistent with the defense theories, was also instructed on the lesser included offenses of
assault on a peace officer, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.4 (1999), and simple assault, UTAH

2

The complaints are not those raised on appeal (R. 45-46; R148: 2-19).
3

CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 (1999) (R 100-02). The jury convicted defendant as charged (R.
131). The court sentenced defendant to imprisonment for five-years-to-life, consecutive to
a one-to-fifteen-year sentence defendant was already serving (R 78; R147: 149).
On April 20, 2001, defendant filed a pro se motion for new trial, which was denied
on April 19, 2001 (R. 82-84).3 Two years later, defendant filed a post-conviction petition
based, in part, on the failure to appeal his conviction (R. 134). On February 24, 2003, the
court re-sentenced defendant nunc pro tunc to enable him to appeal. See Second Dist. Ct.
Docket No. 001903816FS. On March 13, 2003, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal
from the 2001 judgment and conviction. See Utah Court ofAppeals Docket No. 20030218CA and R. 144 (amended notice).
STATEMENT OF FACTS4
What should have been a routine "knock and talk" had turned deadly. Defendant had
both his hands on Detective Nathan Jensen's service revolver as the two struggled back and
forth (R146: 158). The detective thought, "I [am] going to die" (id.).
"He's running, help."
On August 25,2000, Agent Chad Barnett, Agent Troy Burnett, and Detective Jensen,
members of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force, went a South Ogden condominium

3

The motion raised grounds different than those raised on appeal (R. 82-84).

4

Defendant concedes the evidence supports his conviction. See Brief of Appellant
[Br.Aplt.J at 9. Because the issues raised are fact-dependent, however, the facts are set
out in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2.

4

to investigate a complaint that marijuana was being used and sold on the premises (R146: 5354, 58-59, 136, 141). Their intent was to conduct a "knock and talk" (R146: 57-58, 104).5
The officers walked through an open gate into a large fenced patio area (R146:60-61).
Kyle Bass was seated on the steps leading to the condominium's front door (id.). Because
the officers were in plain clothes, Agent Burnett explained they were with the Weber-Morgan
Narcotics Strike Force and identified the officers by name (R146: 63,106,108,144). Agents
Burnett and Jensen displayed their badges (R146: 63, 104-05, 139, 145; R147: 26, 32, 67).
Kyle said he did not live there (R146: 108).
The officers knocked on the front door (id.). Danny Winder, the owner/occupant,
responded (R146: 64, 108; R147: 72). Jason Maisey, defendant's brother, and Jason's
girlfriend, Amanda, came out (R146: 64,108). The officers again introduced themselves as
police officers and displayed their badges (R146: 108; R147: 27).
The officers explained why they were there and asked permission to frisk the four
(R146: 106-07). They agreed (R146: 145, 148; R147: 27, 87). Drugs were found on Kyle
and Danny (R146: 64, 145). While still outside, Agent Barnett heard someone descending
the stairs inside the condominium and asked who was inside (R146: 64,145-46). Jason said
his brother Corey (defendant) (R146: 64, 147; R147: 87). The officers and Jason called
defendant by name, but he did not respond (R146: 65, 109).

5

A "knock and talk" is a consensual encounter where the police go to the suspect's
residence, knock on the door, identify themselves as police officers, explain the complaint
received, and "go from there" based on willingness of the owner/occupant to speak with
them and/or permit a search of his person or premises (R146: 57-58, 106-07).
5

Agent Chad Barnett asked Danny if they could go inside to get defendant (R146: 6567, 147). Danny hesitated and asked if he could go in alone (R146: 66). Agent Troy Burnett
explained that for security reasons, they could not agreed to that (id.). Agent Burnett further
explained that if Danny did not consent, the police would need a search warrant to enter (id.).
Danny then consented to the police accompanying him into the residence (R146:65,67,109,
147-48; R147: 28).
Danny went in first, followed by Agent Barnett, who displayed his badge on the
outside of his shirt (R146: 63, 67, 71, 148; R147: 67). Danny lead the officer downstairs
(R146: 67, 109). Danny said he could not see defendant, but the agent asked him to walk
farther into the basement (R146: 68). As they passed a bathroom, Agent Barnett saw
defendant's reflection in the mirror: he was crouched down, hiding behind the bathroom door
(R146: 69-70). Agent Barnett announced, "Police, come out" (R146: 70, 84-85, 90).
Without verbally responding, defendant "bolted" out of the bathroom (R146: 72, 90; R147:
76). He pushed Danny aside and "charged up" the stairs "like an offensive running back in
football" (R146: 72; R147: 18-19). Barnett yelled, "He's running, help" (R146: 72-73).
"I'm the police, chill out."
When Agent Barnett went downstairs, Agent Burnett remained at the top of the stairs
for security (R146: 109). Burnett's badge and service revolver were exposed on his belt
(R146: 104, 112, 127). As defendant bolted up the stairs and saw Burnett, he did not pause
(R146: 112). Instead, he attempted to push pass Burnett or push him on "his butt" by
"lunging" at him and hitting him in the chest (R146: 112, 128-29). Burnett felt defendant

•'•"•
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.

had assaulted him and hit him back (R146: 128; R147: 95). Swinging at each other, they fell
out the front door and off the steps onto the patio where they wrestled on the ground (R146:
112-13). Burnett yelled at defendant, "I'm the police, chill out" (R146: 113, 132-33).
Defendant continued to fight (R146: 113).
"He's getting my gun."
Detective Jensen was on the patio with Kyle, Jason, and Amanda (R146: 148).
Everything was "very calm" until Jensen heard Barnett's call for help, heard a bang "like
something falling down," and then saw defendant and Burnett struggling on the ground
(R146: 148-49). He heard Burnett tell defendant that he was a police officer and to "chill
out"(R146: 152).
When Jensen ran to assist Burnett, defendant looked directly at him (R146: 151).
Jensen had his badge in his hand (R146: 149-50). He extended his arm, placing the badge
in front of defendant, and yelled, "We're the police, we're the police" (R146: 151-52).
Defendant "flailed" at him and hit the badge out of his hand (R146: 152).
Jensen pulled out his service revolver, holding it tight into his body to minimize the
possibility that defendant could grab or dislodge the weapon (R146: 149, 151-52).
Nevertheless, as Jensen tried to hand-cuff him, defendant slipped out of Burnett's grip and
grabbed Jensen's gun with both his hands (R146: 153-55). Jensen pulled back on the gun
with "all his might," but could not release defendant's grip (R146: 156-57). Instead, as
Jensen pulled, defendant just "came with" him (R146:156). Jensen threw his free arm around
defendant's neck in a bear-hold (R146: 157). They struggled back and forth until the gun

7

was the only thing connecting them, but defendant still would not release his two-handed grip
(R146: 156-57). Jensen shouted, "he's getting my gun" (R146: 116).
"I could shoot him or I could kick him."
Burnett only realized that Jensen had joined the fray when Burnett suddenly found
himself on the ground without defendant (R146:l 15). Burnett saw defendant's hands on
Jensen's gun and realized that defendant was trying to disarm him (id.).
Burnett was worried: children were playing on the other side of the patio fence and
Kyle and the others were standing only feet away (R146: 132, 144). Burnett figured he had
"two choices. Because [defendant's] grabbing the gun, that's deadly force. If he gets that
gun away, everybody out there is in danger. Everybody. Me, everybody. I could shoot him
or I could kick him. I chose to kick him, knock him out" (R146:125-26, 132).
Burnett stood on the front steps, slightly above defendant and Jensen, and kicked
defendant as hard as he could in the face (R146: 116). Defendant did not react (id.). Burnett
could not understand how defendant was still standing after the blow, much less still fighting,
and wondered why defendant did not simply run since the front gate was open and unblocked
(R146: 133). Jensen similarly wondered why defendant did not try to "bowl" him over and
"get out of Dodge" (R146: 158). The two officers came to same conclusion: defendant
wanted Jensen's gun (R146: 116-17, 124, 131).
The gun was slipping out of Jensen's hand (Rl 46: 156-59). He believed if defendant
got it, Jensen "was going to die" (R146: 158). Jensen made a "last ditch effort... to take
[defendant] to the ground" (Rl 46:158-59). When that failed, Jensen pulled the gun's trigger,

8

hoping to hit defendant mid-body (R146: 159). Instead, the bullet hit defendant's hand (id.).
Defendant did not stop fighting (R146: 118-19, 123-24, 131, 159, 165).
Agent Barnett ran to help Jensen (R146: 74-75). Barnett pulled defendant's legs out
from under him (R146: 75, 122). The two officers fell or sat on defendant, who continued
to struggle on the ground (R146: 75-76,118-20). Jensen wrapped a shirt around defendant's
bleeding hand (Rl 46:159-60). As defendant lay bleeding, he screamed, "those pigs just shot
me" (R146: 120, 225; R147: 29, 92, 104).
Defendant later confessed that he knew the officers were "cops," but denied grabbing
Jensen's gun (R147: 18-20). At trial, the defense argued that defendant was under the
influence of methamphetamine and mistakenly thought the officers were gang members
(R147: 122-37).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Fourth Amendment Claim Raised Under Ineffective Counsel and Plain Error:
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the legality of
his seizure, which defendant characterizes as occurring when Agent Barnett ordered him out
of hiding. He also claims that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte declaring the
seizure illegal. Defendant argues that if the Fourth Amendment issue had been addressed
below, it would have resulted in the suppression of the evidence which flowed from the
seizure, i.e., his ensuing confrontation with the officers. Utah precedent summarily disposes
of defendant's claim.

9

In Utah, a person has no right to physically resist a police order, irrespective of the
legality of the order. Consequently, the lawfulness of Agent Barnett's directive has no
impact on the outcome of this case: whether lawful or not, defendant had no right to resist
the order by assaulting the officers and disarming Detective Jensen. Additionally, Utah law
recognizes that a prior police illegality becomes irrelevant if the suspect, as defendant did
here, commits an intervening illegal act, in this case, assault on Agent Burnett and disarming
Detective Jensen.
A motion to suppress would have been futile and, therefore, counsel was not
ineffective and the court did not plainly err in not addressing the Fourth Amendment issue.
A dmission ofDefendant's Fugitive Status to Establish Motive: Defendant similarly
ignores established law in arguing that evidence of his fugitive status was irrelevant to the
charged offense. Universally, courts recognize that when a defendant forcibly resists or
confronts a police order, the defendant's fugitive status is highly relevant to his motive and
intent. Consequently, such evidence is commonly admitted.
In this case, the trial court scrutinized the evidence of defendant's fugitive status by
considered its relevancy and weighing its probative value and prejudicial impact. Pursuant
to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the court then correctly exercised its discretion and
admitted the bad acts evidence to establish defendant's motive in fleeing and forcibly
confronting the officers.

10

ARGUMENT
POINT t
THE LEGALITY OF THE UNDERLYING POLICE ORDER HAS NO
RELEVANCE TO THE OFFENSE OF DISARMING A PEACE
OFFICER; CONSEQUENTLY, TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT
INEFFECTIVE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR
IN FAILING TO ADDRESS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUE
Defendant claims that he was unlawfully seized when Officer Barnett ordered him to
"come out" of the bathroom {Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 20-21). Defendant failed to
preserve this claim below and, therefore, the issue is waived unless he now establishes that
he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel or that the trial
court plainly erred. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 9, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74, Tf 11, 10 P.3d 346. To that end, defendant claims that his trial counsel was
deficient in failing to challenge his seizure and the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte
declaring the seizure illegal {Br.Aplt. at 14 & 20). Defendant further argues that if the Fourth
Amendment issue had been raised below, his subsequent acts of fleeing, assaulting, and
disarming the officers would have been suppressed and the evidence of his parole fugitive
status would have been inadmissible {Br.Aplt. at 16 & 25). But for the failure to address the
Fourth Amendment issue, defendant claims he would not have been convicted {Br.Aplt. at
16 & 23-24).
Defendant's argument, however, ignores controlling precedent. Utah law firmly
recognizes that a person may not forcibly resist a police order, irrespective of its legality.

6

Point I responds to defendant's Points I, II, & III.
11

Consequently, whether the directive to "come out" was lawful or not, defendant had no right
to react to it with force. See American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131,1ft 13-16,
63 P.3d 675 (holding that the lawfulness of an attempted arrest or detention does not divest
a police officer of his authority and, therefore, is "irrelevant" to a conviction for interfering
with a peace officer); State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 33, 57 P.3d 1052 (reaffirming that "in
Utah there is no right to physically resist either an arrest or an order of the police, irrespective
of the legality or the arrest or order, so long as the officers are within the scope of their
authority"); State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574-76 (Utah 1991) (rejecting common law
rule and holding that in Utah, the prosecution need not establish the lawfulness of the order
which precipitated an assault on a police officer who "is doing what he or she was employed
to do"). Moreover, a prior illegality is inconsequential, if in response, defendant commits
a new intervening crime. See State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah App. 1997
(holding that "[a]n illegal entry or prior illegality by officers does not affect the subsequent
arrest of a defendant where there is an intervening illegal act by the suspect"and, therefore,
is ); State v. Wagstaff, 846 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App.) (holding that a prior undisputed
illegal seizure was "inconsequential" once the defendant tampered with the evidence and,
thereby, committed a new crime), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (1993).
In sum, because determination of the Fourth Amendment issue would not affect the
outcome of defendant's conviction, he suffered no prejudice from the failure to consider it.

12

(A) Analytical Framework of a Fourth Amendment Claim in the Context of
the Sixth Amendment and Plain Error.
To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that his or her "counsel's performance was deficient, in that
it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment[,]" and that the
deficiency was prejudicial, in that it "affected the outcome of the case." See Litherland, 2000
UT 76, f 19. Likewise, to establish that the trial court plainly erred, a defendant must show
that "an error occurred that should have been obvious to the trial court and that prejudiced
the outcome of his trial." Id. atf 31.
While the requirements of deficient performance and obvious error are distinct, in
application, they are similar-for in both cases, the underlying claim must have merit. See
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ] 34, 989 P.2d 52; State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, f 22,
55 P.3d 1147; State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 41, 55 P.3d 1131 (all recognizing that
counsel has no constitutional duty to raise non-meritorious motions), cert, denied, 63 P.3d
104 (Utah 2003); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) (requiring that a trial
court actually err for plain error). In addition, the prejudice prongs of both standards are
identical. Litherland, 2002 UT 76, ^fl| 19,31 &n.l4. Thus, to prevail under either analysis,
defendant must establish that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and would have
resulted in the exclusion of evidence necessary to support his conviction. See Kimmelman
v. Morrison, Ml U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (addressing Fourth Amendment argument raised in
context of Sixth Amendment claim). Accord Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 & 1225 (defining

13

prejudice under both analyses as a "reasonable probability" that absent the error, the outcome
of the trial would have been "more favorable").
Here, defendant fails to meet these requirements.
(B) Defendant Has Not Established that an Illegality Occurred,
The State maintains that Agent Barnett's directive to defendant to "come out" from
hiding was lawful, but even if it were unlawful, defendant had no right to forcibly resist it.
See Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131,H[13-16; Trane, 2002 UT 97, f 33; Gardiner, 814 P.2d at
574-76. Additionally, even if the directive were unlawful, defendant's commission of a new
intervening crime dissipated any taint. See Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008; Wagstaff, 846 P.2d
at 1313. Consequently, because lack of prejudice disposes of the Fourth Amendment issues,
its merits need not be determined. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31 n.14 (recognizing
"analytical shortcut" whereby lack of prejudice disposes ofboth ineffective counsel and plain
error claims). Nevertheless, the State summarily addresses defendant's argument to correct
its factual and legal errors.
Defendant asserts that his counsel conducted no discovery and did not recognize that
a Fourth Amendment issue existed (Br.Aplt. at 13 & 15), These allegations have no record
support. Instead, the existing record demonstrates that trial counsel actively engaged in
pretrial preparation and that when that preparation was questioned, albeit on other grounds,
the trial court found no deficiency in counsel's pretrial preparation (R. 12-13,23,26, 51-52,
69-70, 73; R148: 2-19). The record also establishes that counsel was clearly prepared for
trial and presented an active and focused defense (R146: 17,26-39,48-53, 78-88,92-93,95-
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102,122-31,161-65,173-75,201-03,210-18,226-31;R147: 1-11,20-30,36-37,40-53,6375, 79-91, 122-37). See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 17 (presuming "that any argument of
ineffectiveness presented [on appeal] is supported by all the relevant evidence of which
defendant is aware," and, therefore, any ambiguities or deficiencies in the record "will be
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively"). See also Yarborough
v. Gentry, 2003 WL 22382563 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2003) (recognizing that the presumption that
counsel exercised professional judgment applies with even greater force when the appellant
"bases his ineffective-assistance claim solely on the trial record"). Compare Kimmelman,
All U.S. at 368-69 & 385 (finding trial counsel deficient for failing to challenge a search
only after an evidentiary hearing established that counsel failed to conduct any discovery and
admitted he was unaware a search occurred until one day before trial).
Defendant next contends that Danny, the owner/occupant, did not consent to the
police entry into his home (Br.Aplt. at 22). Again, this claim is not supported by the record.
Agents Barnett, Burnett, and Jensen testified that Danny consented to the police entry and
led Barnett downstairs. See Statement of Facts, supra. While Danny initially offered to go
in alone and momentarily hesitated when first asked for consent, he did not claim that his
consent was not voluntary (R146: 65-67, 109, 147-48; R147: 28, 67, 76).7 Nor is there any
record support for defendant's claim that Danny was "threatened" with a search warrant
(Br.Aplt. at 22); he was simply told that if he did not consent, the police needed a warrant to
enter the residence (R146: 66).

7

Danny was a defense witness at trial (R147: 65).
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Defendant argues that even if Danny's consent were valid, "once the Defendant is
seen and asked to come out, his refusal countermands any possible permission received from
Danny" (Br.Aplt. at 22). Again, defendant's argument lacks support. When Agent Barnett
saw defendant's reflection in the mirror and asked him to "come out," defendant did not
refuse; to the contrary, he "bolted" from the bathroom, pushed Danny aside, and ran full
speed up the stairs. See Statement of Facts, supra. The State is aware of no authority—and
defendant cites none—for the proposition that a suspect's flight withdraws a third-party's
consent to search.
Nor is there legal support for defendant's assertion that hiding from the police in the
common areas of another person's home creates a legitimate expectation of privacy when the
owner/occupant consents to the search {Br.Aplt. at 22). Compare State v. Bissegger, 2003
UT App 256,ffl[6-7 & 12, 76 P.3d 178 (recognizing constitutional privacy interest in a
passenger's opaque lip-balm container because the passenger's expectation of privacy in the
closed personal item was subjectively and objectively reasonable). Nor is there any record
support for defendant's suggestion that he had the authority to override Danny's consent.
Defendant also claims that when Officer Barnett directed defendant to "come out"of
hiding, the otherwise consensual search escalated to an arrest requiring probable cause or,
at minimum, to a level-two detention requiring reasonable suspicion (Br.Aplt. at 20). Again,
defendant's argument lacks merit. A directive to come out of hiding does not constitute a
"seizure" when the defendant flees. See State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App.
1990) (recognizing that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurs if a person disregards the
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police order), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). Accord Scott v. Maryland, 782 A.2d
862, 869 (Md. App. 2001) (holding that no seizure occurs during "knock and talk" until the
police by physical force or show of authority restrain an occupant's liberty), cert, denied, 535
U.S. 940 (2002).
Here, no Fourth Amendment seizure occurred until defendant reached the top of the
stairs, defendant assaulted Agent Burnett, and the agent fought back (R146: 111-12,128-29;
R147: 31-32, 73, 76). See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing
that a Forth Amendment detention occurs "when the officer by means of physical force or
show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a person") (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Consequently, even if the police had no authority to enter the
home or direct defendant to "come out,"as argued by defendant, defendant's seizure was
permissible because he committed a new intervening crime, assault. See Griego, 933 P.2d
at 1008 (refusing to extent the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to a new intervening crime
committed by a defendant in response to a prior illegality); Wagstaff, 846 P.2d at 1312-13
(same in context of tampering). Accord United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1017-18
(11th Cir. 1982) (considering essentially identical facts and concluding that "the police may
legally arrest a defendant for a new, distinct crime, even if the new crime is in response to
police misconduct and causally connected thereto"), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983). See
also 3 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel Criminal Procedure § 9.4(f), at 381 (2d Ed.
1999) (recognizing that when a suspect responds to a police illegality by assaulting an
officer, he may be arrested for the new crime); State v. Aydelotte. 665 P.2d 443,447 (Wash.
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App. 1983) (recognizing that "all courts which have considered this issue . . . agree that
evidence of [post-illegal] entry assaults on police officers are outside the scope of the
exclusionary rule").
In sum, even if this Court were to address the substance of the Fourth Amendment
issue, defendant has not established that his claim is meritorious. Consequently, he has not
established that his counsel performed deficiently or that the trial court obviously erred in
failing to address it below. See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, % 34; Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, ff
22-26; Z)iaz, 2002 UT App 288, If 41-44.
(C) Even If an Illegality Occurred, Defendant Has Not Established
Prejudice.
As previously stated, a shortcut in analyzing ineffective counsel and plain error claims
is to simply address prejudice. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31 n. 14. If a defendant cannot
establish that the alleged errors impacted the outcome of the trial, the claims necessarily fail.
Id. Here, lack of prejudice summarily disposes of defendant's claims.
Defendant presupposes that once he establishes an illegality, any evidence which
flows from the illegality is required to be suppressed (Br.Aplt. at 24-26). While this is the
general rule, its application is not universal. Instead, in Utah, the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine is inapplicable and suppression unwarranted when, in response to a police illegality,
the defendant responds with force against the officer or commits a new intervening crime.8
See Trane, 2002 UT 97, \ 33 (refusing to overturn a drug possession conviction which
8

The cases cited by defendant (Br.Aplt. at 18-22), are not determinative of this
issue because none involved the Fourth Amendment issue raised here, i.e., an alleged
police illegality followed by the defendant's use of force or commitment of a new crime.
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flowed from Trane's arrest for interfering, because, irrespective of the legality of the original
police order, Trane physically resisted); Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574-76 (refusing to consider
the lawfulness of an order which precipitated Gardiner's assault on a police officer who was
"doing what he . . . was employed to do"); Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008 (holding that "[a]n
illegal entry or prior illegality by officers does not affect the subsequent arrest of a defendant
where there is an intervening illegal act by the suspect," i.e., assault by a prisoner). Accord
Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131,1fl[ 14-16 (reaffirming that the Utah rule prohibiting the use of
force in response to an alleged police illegality does not undermine the Fourth Amendment,
but recognizes society's greater interest in the peaceful judicial settlement of differences).
Here, the officers were doing what officers are suppose to do. See Gardiner, 814 P.2d
at 574 (establishing that the test for whether an officer is acting within his or her "scope of
authority" is whether the "officer is doing what he or she was employed to do or is engag[ed]
in a personal frolic of his or her own") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Having received a complaint that drugs were being used or sold at the condominium, they
went to the residence with the intention of conducting a "knock and talk." Such an
investigative approach is standard and proper. See Scott, 782 A.2d at 867-68 (recognizing
"well-established" rule that "police officers, in the course of their official business, are
permitted to approach one's dwelling and seek permission to question the occupant"). See
also Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, ^f 13 (recognizing that whether an officer acts within the
scope of his authority is not contingent upon the lawfulness of the detention or arrest, but on
whether the officer's actions had the "indicia of being lawful").
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Moreover, even if defendant had the right to ignore the officer and flee the premises,
that right—to the extent it ever existed—stopped the moment defendant assaulted Agent
Burnett. Utah law does not permit an arrest for a new crime to be invalidated simply because
it flowed from a prior police illegality. See Griego, 933 P.2d at 1008. Indeed, as this Court
recognizes:
"' [a] contrary rule would virtually immunize a defendant from prosecution for
all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient causal connection to the
police misconduct.... Unlike the situation where in response to the unlawful
police action the defendant merely reveals a crime that already has been or is
being committed, extending the fruits [of the poisonous tree] doctrine to
immunize a defendant from arrest for new crimes gives a defendant an
intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts so long as they are
sufficiently connected to the chain of causation started by the police
misconduct. This result is too far reaching and too high a price to pay in order
to deter police misconduct.
Id. (quoting Wagstaff, 846 P.2d at 1313 (quoting Bailey, 691 F.2d at 1017)).
In sum, irrespective of the legality of Agent Barnett's directive to come out of hiding,
defendant's subsequent illegal use of force against the officers precludes suppression.
Consequently, resolution of the Fourth Amendment issue would not affect defendant's
conviction. Without prejudice, defendant's claims necessarily fail.
POINT If
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF
DEFENDANT'S FUGITIVE STATUS TO ESTABLISH HIS MOTIVE
IN ATTEMPTING TO FLEE AND THEN ATTACKING THE POLICE.
During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, defendant objected to admission of
evidence of his parole fugitive status (R146: 210). The trial court properly ruled that
9

This point responds to defendant's Point IV.
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defendant's fugitive status was relevant, pursuant to rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, to
explain his reaction to the police, and that any unfair prejudice from the admission of the
evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value under rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence (R146: 211, 214, 216). See Addendum A (rules). The court then correctly
concluded that the evidence was admissible, pursuant to rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence,
to establish defendant's motive in initially fleeing and then forcibly confronting the police
(R146: 214, 218). See Addendum B (argument and oral ruling). See also State v. Holbert,
2002UTApp426,f24,61P.3d291;5ra^v.5rarf/^;,2002UTApp348,ff

17-18, 57 P.3d

1139 (explaining the interplay of rules 402, 403, and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence).
Defendant correctly cites the applicable standards, but fails to acknowledge that the
court's ruling is consistent with Utah precedent and the majority view that a defendant's
fugitive status is relevant and probative of his motive and intent in fleeing and/or forcibly
confronting police.
Most individuals peacefully submit to police orders (R146: 121-22, 165). When a
suspect responds with force, his or her status as a fugitive and its attendant fear of returning
to prison become relevant to the suspect's motive and intent. See State v. Collier, 736 P.2d
231,234 (Utah 1987) (affirming the admission of evidence of the defendant's fugitive status
to establish his motive in shooting at the police to avoid apprehension, where defendant
claimed that his drug intoxication made him think that the officers were assailants attacking
him); State v. Neal, 262 P.2d 756, 125 (Utah 1953) (holding that evidence that the defendant
was on parole and wanted on felony-warrants was "certainly material" and admissible to
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show his motive in killing a police officer), cert, denied, 347 U.S. 963 (1954). Accord
United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394-95 (3rd Cir. 2003); Weitz v. State, 794 P.2d 952,
956 (Alaska App. 1990); State v. Hampton, 855 P.2d 621, 624-26 & n. 16 (Or. 1993) (en
banc) (all recognizing that a defendant's fugitive and parole status are "highly relevant" and
admissible pursuant to rule 404(b)-type rules, where defendant used force against an officer).
Here, it was essentially undisputed that defendant was high on methamphetamine or
some other drug at the time of the offense. Agent Barnett, a drug recognition officer,
testified that defendant's continued aggressiveness after being shot was typical of
methamphetamine users (R146: 76, 86-87). Dr. Robert Rothfeder, the defense expert,
explained that ingestion of methamphetamine often results in extreme strength and
aggressive behavior, and if ingested in high amounts, may result in distorted judgment,
paranoia, and delusions (R147: 49-64).
Defendant argued that his ingestion of drugs affected his intent in that he mistakenly
believed the officers were gang members out to get him ; defendant argued this made him
guilty only of simple assault (R147: 134-37).l0 He also claimed that even if the jury believed
he knew the men were police officers, he did not intentionally try to disarm Detective Jensen
and, therefore, was guilty only of assault on a peace officer (id.).
The prosecutor's position was that while drugs may have added to defendant's
aggression and allowed him to withstand being kicked and shot, defendant knew the agents
were police officers and intentionally disarmed the detective (R146: 210-12; R147: 113-17,
10

§ 76-2-306 (1999) restricts evidence of voluntary drug usage
to intentional and knowing crimes.
UTAH CODE ANN.
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139). To counter the defense theory that defendant's drug usage drove his fear (R146: 211,
218), the prosecutor, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, moved to admit evidence
that defendant was a fugitive from parole at the time of the incident (R146: 210). The
prosecutor argued that defendant's motive in violently confronting the police was to avoid
capture at any cost (R146: 210-12). The prosecutor agreed that this was probably not
defendant's only motive since the basement was "full of pornography" and defendant's
wallet, abandoned in the bathroom, contained drugs (R146: 217). But the prosecutor felt that
introduction of the latter offenses was more complicated than the evidence of defendant's
fugitive status and would create a trial within a trial, especially since the drug charge was
pending trial (R146: 215-17).
The court agreed (R146:215-16,218). See Addendum B (argument and ruling). The
court cautioned the prosecutor that only defendant's fugitive status was relevant to his motive
in fleeing and forcibly confronting the police, not his underlying conviction (R146: 216).
The court then compared the simplicity of establishing fugitive status with the complexity
of establishing possession of drugs or pornography and concluded that it was "cleaner" and
more probative to introduce defendant's fugitive status to explain why defendant "wanted
to get away and why he would contest... so aggressively]" (R146: 214, 216). The court
considered the prejudicial impact of the fugitive evidence, but determined that its unfair
prejudicial impact did not outweigh its probative value (R146: 211, 214, 216, 218).
Nevertheless, to minimize improper use of the evidence, the court instructed the jury on its
non-character relevancy (R146: 218-19,224-25). See State v. Valdez,M>2 P.2d53,55 (Utah

•
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1967) (encouraging trial courts to give a cautionary instruction concerning other crimes
evidence if requested by counsel).
The court's ruling complies with the requirements of rules 402, 403, and 404(b) and
with the appellate courts' directive to scrutinize prior bad acts evidence before admitting it.
See Holbert, 2002 UT App 426,fflf30-32; Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, ^ 19. Nevertheless,
defendant argues that the trial court's ruling did not meet these evidentiary requirements
because it amounted to no more that a "simple conclusory statement" (Br.Aplt. at 31). The
record does not support this assertion. See Addendum B (R146: 211, 214, 215-216, 218).
Defendant's real complaint is with the court's finding that his fugitive status was
relevant and probative (R146: 211 & 214). As previously discussed, the court's ruling is
consistent with the majority view. See cases cited, supra. Nevertheless, defendant claims
the ruling was "premature," because he had not yet presented a defense (Br.Aplt. at 25). The
argument ignores the record facts and Utah precedent. In this case, counsel did not conceal
the defense. Prior to trial, defense counsel properly explained the defense in securing the
appointment of his expert, Dr. Rothfeder (R. 51-52, 69-70). He also explained the defense
in his opening statement (R146: 50-51). Additionally, when the rule 404(b) motion was
argued, counsel did not claim that introduction of the bad acts evidence was premature: he
acknowledged that he would be presenting witnesses to establish that defendant's motive in
fleeing and then confronting the police was his mistaken belief that the officers were gang
members, which belief was in part fueled by drug intoxication (R146: 210-11). Moreover,
even if the court had been unaware of the specifics of defendant's defense, admission of the
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bad acts evidence in the State's case-in-chief was permissible because defendant's not guilty
plea put every element of the offense at issue. See Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, f^f 21 & 23
(recognizing that when intent and knowledge are elements of the crime, the prosecution may
introduce bad acts evidence in its case-in-chief to establish a defendant's motive and intent).
See also Collier, 736 P.2d at 233 (recognizing that a "[defendant's status as a wanted
fugitive [is] clearly indicative of his motive to avoid capture" and admissible to prove that
he was "not mistaken as to the identity of the police officers"); Neal, 262 P.2d at 758
(recognizing that where defendant was a fugitive when he killed a police officer, evidence
of his status was admissible to show his "state of mind . . . as to his knowledge that he was
being sought, his fear of apprehension and the consequences thereof were certainly material
as bearing upon the likelihood and motive he might have" in suing force against the officer).
In sum, defendant has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of his fugitive status to establish motive.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction for disarming a peace officer should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this &&fa day of November, 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all cnminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a)( 1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of
the accused offered by the prosecution;
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon
request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown,
of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial.
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(The jury exits the courtroom.)
MR. WESTMORELAND:

Your Honor, the next witness that

the state would call part of his testimony would be the fact
that he called in to dispatch and found that there was a
warrant out for the defendant, that he was on parole with
Adult Probation and Parole and was a fugitive at that time.
Obviously the defense is going to object to that evidence
coming in.

The state believes that that falls under .404 B

under motive as to the reasoning behind his running and his
actions because he knew that he was on probation and parole
at the time, and that as a result of that, that would explain
or give him at least motive and knowledge at that time.
Because if this were a drug dealer or somebody else that was
coming to get him, there would be no reason for him to run
like that.
The fact that he was on parole at the time would suggest
or at least give him motive and knowledge and that falls
under the exception under 404 B to allow that evidence in.
And is not more prejudicial than probative.

It does go to

the state's case and would show the reasoning behind it and
the reason that he was acting the way that he did.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
Honor.

We obviously object to that, your

Our contention is that that is more prejudicial than

probative to have the jury know that he was -- to have the
jury know that he was on parole.

Certainly the state is free
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to make whatever argument they want to at the end of the
case.

Obviously we're going to argue something differently.

The state's contention at this point is that his motive
for running couldn't have been provided by any other persons
of the drug culture coming to the home.

We actually intend

to produce evidence that that, in fact, was a possible
motive.

But we would submit to the Court that the evidence

that he was on parole is irrelevant, it's highly prejudicial
and is does not —

however the rule states it —

that it's

more prejudicial than probative.
THE COURT:

Of course the rule, it's not just

whether it's one or the other.

Rule 403 says, "Although

relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues."
And so the question is not just which way does it tip,
but all evidence is presumed to be relevant.

And it's only

excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Tell me again why you

feel, Mr. Westmoreland, why it's important that they
understand that he was on parole.
MR. WESTMORELAND:

Your Honor, if they understand he

was on parole and knowing what parole is —

they don't need

to know the reason he was on parole, what he had done prison
time for prior to that.

Simply the fact that he was on
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parole and that he was a fugitive at the time, that would be
the testimony, that he was a fugitive, and knowing that these
are police officers, at least our evidence is they identified
themselves as police officers, knowing that he's fugitive and
that he very likely could be taken into custody again because
he is a fugitive, that goes directly to what we're trying to
prove to give other reasons for why he was running.
We understand what the defense's point is going to be and
this is extremely relevant.

It does not —

is not

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature.

This is

not prejudicial that it shows other crimes or something.

It

simply shows that he was a fugitive and that he was afraid of
the police officers because he did not want to be taken into
custody again.

Then it goes through and explains exactly —

or it shows at least it gives us an argument and gives them a
rational reason to see what his —

why his behavior was the

way it was.
THE COURT:

See —

go ahead and respond, then I'll

ask you a question.
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Well, I suppose basically this comes

down to a dispute in the evidence.

Even the state's own

witnesses some of them indicate that they were not clear as
to whether other officers identified themselves to the
defendant.
I think what's really relevant at this point is that at
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the point the defendant began to run, did he know.

And we

anticipate producing evidence from Danny Winder who was —
the testimony shows was with Officer Barnett at the time that
the defendant was located in the bathroom and ran. I
anticipate that Mr. Winder will testify that the officer did
not identify himself as an officer at that point.
comes down to a he said/he said kind of thing.

So it

And under

those circumstances, what the jury is going to have to is
weigh the credibility of the officer's testimony against the
credibility of the other witnesses1 testimony, we end up
clouding the issue with something that clearly is
prejudicial.

The question is how much how much prejudice

does it carry to something that is clearly prejudicial and
saying oh, by the way, this guy was on parole and he was a
fugitive.
It's difficult enough -- for the defendant in any
criminal case has a tough enough time by sitting here at the
defense table being in charged with a crime.

And it's

difficult enough to try to convince a jury that they need to
believe these citizen witnesses over police officer
witnesses, because we all know no matter we say under the law
and the Constitution, we all know that people generally
believe police officers over citizens.

So that battle alone

is quite enough for the defendant without binding him with
this clearly prejudicial evidence that he was on parole at
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the time.

I mean, the evidence I think is going to be clear

from all witnesses who were there that the defendant ran and
that there was a struggle with police.
THE COURT:

Okay.

But the jury then has to hear

well, why would he run, why would he struggle.
of us would just submit.

I mean, most

What was it that motivated him to

want to contend with a police officer and get away?
Ifm going to deny —

or grant your motion and deny your

objection, Mr. Bouwhuis, because I think that it does go to
show motive to run and why he wanted to get away and why he
would contest.

Because most people would not —

thatfs not

the normal behavior of most of us. Most of us would submit
if we had nothing to hide and it explains why he was so
aggressive with the officer, and so I think that it is
probative in that way.

I acknowledge the prejudice that it

shows, but that probative value is not substantially
outweighed by the prejudice.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
something, your Honor?

For the record, can I just interject
This is not —

as far as I can recall

this has not come out yet in any of the witnesses the state
has presented.

But there is one witness I'm aware of who the

state has who does have this information in his possession,
and that is after this incident was all over with and the
scene was secured, the police went into search the home, in
the area where Corey Maisey was they found a wallet with his
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identification and drugs. And in fact, we put this on the
record earlier, the state intends to file the charge based on
the possession of drugs there and that —

the record would

reflect that that is not a stretch to say that he wanted to
get away because he knew that there were drugs in the
bathroom and that they could be tied to him and that could
provide another motivation for him to run.
the state —

And I donft think

as far as the factual representation I think the

state would agree.
THE COURT:

But is there evidence that the state has

right now that there's been a testing of those drugs and they
know what it is, can they really show that it was his as
opposed to somebody else's in the home?
MR. WESTMORELAND:

Well, we don't have any —

just

for the record, we don't have any intent of putting that
evidence on.

That's another case for another day.

worried about to —

All we're

I mean, if the defense wants to bring

that up, that's great.

You know, we'll bring in rebuttal

witnesses to take care of that issue.

But we don't intend on

putting that issue on at all.
THE COURT:

The concern that I have with that,

Mr. Bouwhuis, and I appreciate your advocacy, but I think
that we do then is we create another case within this case.
We create a drug case within this case, which I think also
has great prejudice toward the defendant.

We then have to
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put on a chain of evidence to show that he had knowledge the
drugs were his, you know, the testing of the drugs and I
think that takes up a lot time.

And I think that just the

fact that he maybe was on parole is clean and I think it
explains motive and that's what the state wants.

And Ifm

finding that the probative value of that evidence is not
substantially outweighed —

or excuse me, that the unfair

prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative
value.

I think it is probative.

I think it explains motive,

I will limit the state, however, in that they are not to
testify as to what the charge was or the conviction unless
the defendant feels that at that point based on my ruling
that it would be probably in his advantage to have that on
because it might —

rather than have him —

rather than have

the jury speculate about something very serious, it might be
more minimal.

I don't know what he's on parole for.

I'll

leave that up to your judgment.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
record reflects this.
mentioned —

Let me just real briefly just so the
On the issue that the Court

and I accept the Court's ruling on the issue.

But the Court stated that we would create a case within a
case trying to show a connection with the drugs and the
testing and all of that, but I think the real issue goes to
his motive of running and that wouldn't have to do with
whether the stuff was tested but whether or not he believed
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at that time he was getting caught with drugs, not whether
they actually ended up being tested as drugs.

What it all

goes to is what his state of mind was at the time and I just
wanted the record to reflect that.
THE COURT:
a moment.

Yeah.

Let me think about that for just

Do you want to respond?

MR. WESTMORELAND:

Well, your Honor, if that's -- I

mean, if defense counsel wants us to put on a case that we
believe there were drugs down there and that he was the owner
of those drugs and is not going to make us put on a chain of
evidence to suggestion that, yes, it actually was
methamphetamine, that's fine.

I mean, I think all that does

is bolster our case more than anything.
If he wants to put on an alternative theory saying that
there were drugs down there, et cetera, he was running
because of drugs, that's fine.

But I don't see how that has

anything to do with his parole status and the reason he runs.
He could put on as many alternative theories for running as
we wants.

But again, I don't think that precludes us from

putting on the issue that we want to deal with in the fact
that he was on parole.
fine.

We could put that evidence on, that's

But again, I'm not sure that that necessarily helps

the defense's case.
MR. BOUWHUIS:

If I may, your Honor, I don't know if

we're both just advocating our causes here.

But it almost
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sounds like the defendant is being put in a catch-22; choose
the lesser of two evils, you can either tell the jury that
you were on parole or you can tell the jury that you were
using drugs. All we're saying is we don't want the jury to
be told that he was on parole.

We're not saying, Judge, we

want to give you a choice; the drugs or parole.
MR. WESTMORELAND:
with his parole status.

But the drugs have nothing to do

The jury never has to hear nor are

they prejudiced if they don't hear the fact that there are
drugs down there.

I mean, if that's the case, there's

pornography down there which is illegal, there's a whole lot
of other things down there that are illegal, but that does
not vitiate the fact that he was on parole and that that goes
to motive for his running.
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Running because of fear.
Of course running is not the crime,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

I'm going to grant —

going to allow it to come in.

or not —

Let me say this:

If you want,

Mr. Bouwhuis, I will give a cautionary instruction.
will —

I'm

I

I'm willing to give an instruction that their focus

is not to be on the issue that he is on parole, that it is to
be considered only as an explanation of why he might be
running and it's not to be considered for any other purpose,
and particularly, they are not to consider it as proving in
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any way his character in this case.

And if you would like an

instruction to that extent, sort of a cautionary instruction,
Ifm willing to do that.
MR. WESTMORELAND:

Judge, we would request that

instruction, in fact.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Okay.

MR. WESTMORELAND:

I agree with that.

All right.
Can we have a few minutes recess

your Honor?
THE COURT:

Yes.

I need a few minutes as well.

(A recess was taken.)
(The jury enters the courtroom.)
THE COURT:

You may proceed, Mr. Westmoreland.

MR. WESTMORELAND:

The state calls Officer Pat Vega.

EAT VEGA,
having been duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows: .........
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WES1M2KELAND:
Q.

Please tell us your name and spell your last name.

A.

Patrick Vega, V-E-G-A.

Q.

What is your occupation?

A.

Police officer with South Ogden police.

Q.

How long have you been with South Ogden?

A.

Four years.

